A Clear Safety-Exception Victory
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that state-law negligent-selection claims against freight brokers are not barred by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (“FAAAA”) because such claims fall within the Acts safety exception preserving state authority over motor-vehicle safety regulation.
In Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, the Court addressed whether the FAAAA’s safety exception permits claims alleging that a broker negligently selected an unsafe motor carrier to transport freight. The Court held that it does. Specifically, the Court concluded that negligent-selection claims “concern” motor vehicles because they involve the trucks used to transport the shipment. Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, No. 24-1238, slip op. at 5–6 (U.S. May 14, 2026).
The Court framed the issue through the text of the FAAAA’s safety exception, which provides that the Act’s preemption provision “shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A). The Court explained that common-law duties and standards of care are part of a state’s traditional authority to regulate safety and that negligent-selection claims impose a duty of reasonable care in selecting contractors for work involving risk of physical harm. Slip op. at 4–5.
Applying that framework, the Court concluded that requiring a broker to exercise reasonable care in selecting a carrier necessarily relates to the trucks transporting the shipment. The Court stated that requiring a broker “to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier . . . ‘concerns’ motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods.” Id. at 6.
In practical terms, Montgomery allows negligent-selection claims against brokers because they are tied to motor-vehicle safety and, therefore, fall under the FAAAA’s safety exception. The ruling rejects the Seventh Circuit’s approach below and overruled the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Aspen American Insurance Co. v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., 65 F.4th 1261 (11th Cir. 2023), that negligence claims do not fall within the FAAAA’s safety exception.
The Court also declined invitations to narrow the safety exception based on policy concerns. Rejecting the argument that the absence of a safety exception in §14501(b)—which concerns “intrastate” commerce and does not contain a safety exception—should be read to exclude brokers from the §14501(c) safety exception. The Court concluded it was “better to live with the mystery” of why Congress structured the statute that way than to rewrite the statute. Montgomery, slip op. at 7.
Florida’s Federal–State Divide Narrows
Before Montgomery, trucking attorneys in Florida faced the same challenge seen in several other jurisdictions: federal and state courts were applying the FAAAA safety exception differently. Federal courts within the Eleventh Circuit remained bound by Aspen, while Florida state courts were free to analyze broker-liability claims under Florida principles governing persuasive federal authority. Under State v. Dwyer, 332 So. 2d 333, 335 (Fla. 1976), federal appellate decisions interpreting federal law are persuasive, but not controlling, on Florida state courts.
As a result, Florida state and federal courts could reach different outcomes on broker-liability claims arising from the same crash.
After Montgomery, Florida federal courts can no longer rely on Aspen’s conclusion that negligent-selection claims fall outside the FAAAA’s safety exception. Likewise, Florida state courts must now analyze broker-liability claims through the Supreme Court’s broader interpretation of the safety exception when the alleged negligence is tied to motor-vehicle safety.
Of note, the Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that the claims at issue otherwise fell within the FAAAA’s general preemption provision under 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). The Court did not address removal, complete preemption, or any procedural consequences of its holding; those questions remain open for the lower courts.
Similarly, factual disputes regarding whether an entity acted as a broker, motor carrier, or both will remain central. Florida courts already treat that issue as fact-dependent. See Gonzalez v. J.W. Cheatham, LLC, 125 So. 3d 942 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); XPO Logistics, LLC v. Charles, 394 So. 3d 206 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024). Federal courts will likely continue to do the same, although pleading and evidentiary standards may differ by forum.
New Battlegrounds in Litigation
With the safety-exception hurdle largely resolved, future litigation will likely focus less on preemption and more on the factual details of broker conduct.
In many cases, that changes the economics of litigation.
Pleading and Party Structure
Plaintiffs will likely place greater emphasis on detailed allegations regarding carrier vetting, prior safety violations, FMCSA data, out-of-service histories, and internal broker-selection practices. Defendants, in turn, will shift focus toward traditional negligence defenses — including breach, causation, foreseeability, and the reasonableness of the broker’s selection process.
Courts are also likely to continue scrutinizing whether a defendant truly functioned as a broker or instead exercised a level of operational control consistent with a carrier relationship. Even before Montgomery, many cases ultimately turned on factual disputes involving control, carrier selection, and the broker’s actual role in arranging transportation. Those disputes are now likely to become even more significant.
Discovery and Expert Evidence
Broker-selection claims are also likely to expand discovery fights — especially in larger catastrophic-injury cases where plaintiffs are already looking for every available layer of coverage.
Plaintiffs can be expected to seek early production of carrier-review materials, safety-rating evaluations, internal training documents, FMCSA compliance records, communications regarding carrier approval, and evidence regarding prior incidents involving the selected carrier.
Defense counsel should anticipate preservation issues early and maintain documentation reflecting the broker’s actual vetting efforts, including proof of registration checks, insurance verification, and any safety-review procedures in place at the time of selection.
Florida practitioners should also expect heavier scrutiny of onboarding procedures that brokers previously treated as routine administrative functions. Documents that once sat quietly in a carrier file may now become central exhibits in summary judgment briefing or trial presentation.
Expert testimony will continue to be important. Plaintiffs will rely on trucking-industry experts to explain accepted broker-screening practices and the use of publicly available DOT and FMCSA safety information. Defense experts, meanwhile, will focus on industry customs, practical limitations on broker oversight, and distinctions between brokerage functions and carrier operations.
Contracts, Insurance, and Settlement Effects
Montgomery also increases the practical importance of transportation contracts and insurance structures. Most broker-carrier agreements already contain provisions addressing carrier qualifications, indemnity obligations, insurance procurement, and safety-related representations. Following Montgomery, those provisions may receive substantially greater scrutiny during litigation.
Plaintiffs will almost certainly dig into whether the broker agreement imposed any actual carrier-screening obligations — and whether anyone followed them.
Defense counsel, meanwhile, will emphasize contractual language assigning operational responsibility to the carrier itself and may revisit indemnity provisions or Additional Insured obligations to better manage exposure.
The decision may also affect settlement dynamics. Broker defendants potentially bring additional insurance policies, corporate defendants, and contractual relationships into the case valuation process. Plaintiffs may view surviving broker-negligence claims as increasing available recovery sources, while defense counsel will likely focus on the reasonableness of the broker’s vetting practices, the information reasonably available at the time of selection, and the practical limits of broker oversight.
Some defendants may also re-evaluate whether early resolution makes more sense once a broker remains in the case. That calculation becomes especially important where multiple corporate defendants, excess coverage layers, or punitive-exposure arguments are already in play.
Key Takeaway for Florida Practitioners
For Florida practitioners, Montgomery changes the focus of broker-liability litigation. The central battles will now concern factual development, evidentiary support, and the reasonableness of the broker’s conduct rather than broad preemption arguments alone.
The preemption fight is no longer the whole case.
For plaintiffs, that means building a factual record early. FMCSA history, prior violations, out-of-service issues, onboarding documents, insurance requirements, and internal communications may all become more important than broad preemption briefing.
For defendants, the emphasis will shift toward documenting carrier-selection procedures, preserving evidence of compliance efforts, and demonstrating reasonable brokerage practices consistent with industry standards.
For both sides, transportation contracts, insurance structures, expert testimony, and corporate-control evidence will likely become increasingly important as these claims continue developing after Montgomery.
The Supreme Court answered whether these claims may proceed under the safety exception. The next phase of litigation will determine how far they ultimately reach.
